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Law, Economic Growth and Human Development  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper cuts adrift the mainstream approach to the legal-origins debate on the law-
growth nexus by integrating both overall economic and human components in our understanding 
of how regulation quality and the rule of law lie at the heart of economic and inequality adjusted 
human developments. Findings summarily reveal that legal-origin does not explain economic 
growth and human development beyond the mechanisms of law channels. As a policy 
implication results support benefits of the rule of law and quality of regulation as channels to 
economic growth and human development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Enforcement of contracts and property rights lie at the heart of economic and human 
developments. During the past decade, our understanding of the historical evolution of various 
institutional mechanisms to cope with the issues has been greatly enhanced in particular by the 
law and finance literature initiated by La Porta et al. (1998).  While the scope has been 
broadened to include growth at country, industry and firm levels, the human development 
dimension has been sidelined in the so-called legal origins debate that centres on the relative 
merits of common-law versus civil-law and on the impact these two different legal regimes exert 
on financial structures, corporate governance and industrial organization. Our paper cuts adrift 
this mainstream approach by integrating both overall economic and human components in the 
law-growth nexus. Given the relative importance of African countries as transplant colonies 
(neo-colonies) of Western legal traditions, the dire human and economic conditions existing 
there and the on-going debate on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a focus on the 
continent could lead to findings with very appealing policy implications. We also aim to broaden 
the scope of our analysis by integrating dummies that lay emphasis on the positions of sub-
Saharan and North African countries which have been largely neglected in the “legal origin 
debate”.  
 Hitherto most empirical work on the law-growth nexus has been of global appeal and 
based on very limited data. In the aftermath of the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (hence 
LLSV, 1998) 1, the need to collect data that could proxy law standards became a subject to 
                         
1
 Macro-economic law quality data on the African continent was unavailable before the pioneering work of LLSV 
(1998). The first working paper pertaining to the study was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
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concern in World Bank Development Indicators. Today to the best of our knowledge and as far 
as we have perused, the absence of a study that reflects the African continent in the light of 
findings from pioneering studies (and resulting hypotheses) is deserving of examination. As we 
must have emphasized above the African continent is an ideal premise for assessing the 
outcomes of first works because, it is lagging behind in terms of growth and human development 
on the one hand, on other it was (is) subject to colonialism (neocolonialism) and thus a fertile 
ground to investigate what role colonial law legacies have (are) played (playing) in overall 
economic and human developments.  Literature on law-finance (growth) nexus can be classified 
into the following strands.  
 The first strand includes a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country 
differences in legal origin account for cross-country differences in financial development and 
growth. LLSV (1998) pioneered this strand and since then many authors have taken from them 
in asserting the edge English common-law countries have over their French civil-law 
counterparts in prospects of financial development. Emphasis has been made on the fact that 
English common-law traditions (French civil-law traditions) furnish the strongest (weakest) legal 
protection to shareholders and creditors (LLSV, 1998, 2000). This scale has been tipped to other 
aspects of management and government: more informative accounting standards(LLSV,1998), 
better institutions with less corrupt governments(LLSV,1999) as well as more efficient 
courts(Djankow et al.,2003). It is worth noting that this strand has been largely focused on 
understanding ‘if ’ legal-origins matter in financial development. The issue of ‘why’ legal-origins 
matter remained elusive until Beck et al.(2003) assessed some theories to address the concern.  
                                                                               
(NBER) in 1996. Data on the quality of regulation and the rule of law for the African continent saw light as from 
that same year.  
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 In the second strand of the literature Beck et al.(2003) shed some lights on the issues of 
‘why’ legal origins matter in finance by empirically assessing two law channel-based theories. 
The political channel lays emphasis on how legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to 
the rights of individual-investors vis-à-vis the state. It follows that countries that champion 
investors’ rights should have greater prospects for financial development. The adaptability 
channel postulates that legal traditions differ in their capacity to adjust and adapt to changing 
business circumstances. This implies countries in which legal systems provide for adjustments 
with respect to changing and evolving circumstances should have higher prospects for financial 
development. Therefore this strand solves the “why” puzzle in asserting that legal origin matters 
in financial development because traditionally, legal origins differ in their ability to adjust and 
adapt efficiently to changing and evolving economic situations.  
 In the third strand we find literature championing the nexus that financial development 
greatly contributes to a country’s overall economic growth (McKinnon, 1973).  This optimism 
has been shared and empirically supported at the country level (King & Levine, 1993; Levine & 
Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005), as well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 
1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
 The fourth strand looks at the law-finance (growth) relationship. It provides evidence for 
links among law, finance and economic growth at firm, industry and country levels (Demirguc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002).  
 The fifth strand that is largely focused on African countries is pioneered by the Mundell 
(1972) conjecture, which theorized that Anglophone countries shaped by British activism and 
openness (to experiment) would naturally be rewarded by higher levels of financial development 
than their francophone neighbors (influenced by French reliance on monetary rules and 
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automaticity)2. Recent literature on the African continent has either wholly (Agbor, 2011) or 
partially (Asongu, 2011) confirmed the edge English common-law countries have in growth and 
finance prospects respectively3. Historically it should be noted that the partition of Africa into 
British and French spheres in the 19th century resulted in the implementation of two dissimilar 
colonial policies4.The contribution of the present paper to the literature differs from those of 
Agbor (2011) and Asongu (2011) by: (1) investigating the law-growth nexus on the African 
continent and using a North African (sub-Saharan African) dummy to distinguish the effects of 
North African (sub-Saharan African) countries; (2) using law indicators to assess the relationship 
between legal origin and development(economic and human)5; (3) utilizing much novel data6 for 
more focused and updated policy implications7. 
 The rest of the paper is partitioned in the following manner. Section 2 discusses 
economic growth and human development while Section 3 looks at various channels in the law-
growth theory. Data sources and methodology are revealed and discussed respectively in Section 
                         
2
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
3
 While Agbor (2011) investigates how legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011) proposes four 
theories in assessing why legal-origin matters in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the sub-Saharan 
part of Africa.  
4
 The British and French implemented two different colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly 
centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British on their part administered 
pragmatic, flexible and decentralized policies. Economic ambitions dominated British colonial activities who sought 
to transform their colonies into commercially viable trading countries (partners) through the indirect-rule: producing 
raw material for their industries and consuming British manufactures. The French on their part propagated imperial 
ambitions through a policy of assimilation.  
5
 While Agbor(2011) used channels of education and trade to investigate how colonial origin affects the economic 
performance of sub-Saharan African countries, Asongu(2011) on his part has used financial channels in explaining 
why colonial legacy matters in economic growth and welfare. In this study we use law channels.  
6
 The Inequality adjusted Human Development Index we use to proxy human developed was first introduced in the 
2010 Human Development Report. Beyond this truism data on regulatory quality and rule of law from African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank have been largely unexplored due to their limited time series properties 
(data collection began only in 1996).  
7
 While Agbor (2011) used data ranging from 1960 to 2000, that of Asongu (2011) varied from 1986 to 2008. We 
shall used data ranging from 1996 to 2008.  
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4. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 5. We conclude with 
Section 6.  
 
2. Economic growth and human development 
 
2.1 Economic growth 
 
 We define economic growth as the increasing capacity of the economy to meet up with 
the wants of members of societies that constitute it. It can be appreciated either at macro or 
micro-economic levels. In the context of this paper we define macro and micro levels by GDP 
and GDP per capita growth respectively.  
2.2 Human development 
 
 Human development is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon. We hereby refer 
to the economic sense of the term where-by some crucial aspects of the proper livelihood of 
citizens in a country are taken into account. Examples of aspects of this terminology that fall 
within the framework of our paper are: life expectancy, literacy, education, standards of 
living…etc.  We equally intend to lay emphasis on the politico-economic aspect of the term 
because it may also be used to distinguish whether a country is developed or not as a result of the 
impact of its economic policies on the quality of life of its citizens. Such politico-economic 
measures include regulatory quality and the rule of law which we address below.  
 
3. Law channels and development theory 
 
3.1 Regulatory quality 
 
 For this channel we postulate that a legal system that enables independent bodies to set-
up rules oversee their application and sanction those who fail to respect them is more likely to 
foster favorable conditions for economic growth and human development. Aspects of regulatory 
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quality like unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, discriminatory 
taxes, excessive protections, burden of administrative regulations, distortional tax system, import 
barrier, cost of tariffs as obstacle to growth, degree of competition in local market, ease of 
starting a company, laxity of anti-monopoly policy, how  ineffective environmental regulations 
hurt competitiveness, foreign investment nature, banking & Finance,  administered prices and 
market prices, ease of market entry for new firms…etc tend to affect growth in economic and 
human terms in one way or the other. If the power of the government in business activities is 
largely limited by the presence of independent bodies that ensure regulatory quality, then the 
likelihood of development is greater. While most French civil-law countries are characterized by 
little decentralization, appointment of judges and governors by the central government…etc, 
English common-law countries traditionally have regulatory organs that are not appointed by 
government and therefore not subject to any form of allegiance to the power that be in their 
commitment to regulatory quality.  It follows that the independence of regulatory organs in 
English common-law countries naturally provides them with an edge in development over 
French civil-law countries.  
 
3.2 Rule of law 
 
 This channel lays emphasis on the fact that legal traditions differ in their focus on law 
vis-à-vas the rights of the state and private property. Therefore legal systems that champion 
private property ownership and intellectual property rights have the tendency to create favorable 
conditions for economic and human developments. Conversely, legal systems that put more 
emphasis on the power of the state to the detriment of private property rights create conditions 
that deter development at both overall economic and human levels. A logical result is that 
countries with common-law tradition provide better development conditions than those with 
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civil-law traditions. These assertions are in line with the literature (LLSV, 1998; Beck et al., 
2003).   
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Data 
 
 We examine a sample of 38 African countries with British, French and Portuguese legal 
origins (see Appendices 1 and 2). Due to the limited nature of data on human development, we 
are obliged to narrow down to primary database (Panel A of Appendix 1) to a second data-set 
(Panel B of Appendix 1) of 28 countries. Countries with Portuguese legal origin are absent in the 
second data-set. We use the first dataset to account for the effects of legal tradition on growth 
and the second for the effects of legal origin on human development. All variables are taken 
from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB). Owing the limited span 
of data on regulatory quality and rule-of-law, both datasets span from 1996 to 2008.  We also 
add the legal origin of countries in the dataset in order to account for endogeneity. As pointed-
out by Beck et al. (2003) from Berkowitz et al. (2002), it is crucial to distinguish between legal 
origin countries (France, United Kingdom, the U.S.A, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) which 
formed the legal traditions from countries in which the legal legacies were transplanted. 
However this fact doesn’t pose any concern to this paper because legal origins are primarily used 
as instruments. Data collected could be classified in the following categories.  
4.1.1 Law indicators  
 
a) Regulatory Quality  
 
 With respect to the World Bank the quality of regulation captures perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
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and foster private sector development. The concept is appreciated by both representative8 and 
non-representative9 sources. This indicator is measured in percentile rank from 0 to 100.  
b) Rule of Law 
 
 This indicator measures perceptions of the extent to which economic agents have 
confidence in and abide by rules of society, particularly on the quality of property rights, the 
courts, contract enforcement, the police, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The 
measurement is in percentile rank from 0 to 100 from a plethora of criteria from representative10 
and non-representative11 sources.   
                         
8
 Representative sources include: unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, discriminatory 
taxes, excessive protections, foreign investment nature, banking & Finance,  administered prices and market prices, 
ease of market entry for new firms, competition between businesses, regulation arrangements ,investment profiles, 
tax effectiveness, efficiency of  the country’s tax collection system, , burden of administrative regulations, 
distortional tax system, import barrier, cost of tariffs as obstacle to growth, degree of competition in local market, 
ease of starting a company, laxity of anti-monopoly policy, how  ineffective environmental regulations hurt 
competitiveness degree of clarity and transparency in rules, and  assessment of the quality of business laws.  
 
9
 Non-representative sources include: trade policy, access to capital market(foreign and domestic), how ease of 
doing business is not a competitive advantage for the country, freedom of foreign investors to acquire control in 
domestic companies, how public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders, non distortional  nature of  
real personal taxes, business regulatory environment, problematic nature of tax regulations for the growth in 
business, problematic nature of customs and trade regulations for growth in business, competition, price 
liberalization, trade & foreign exchange system, competition policy, conditions for rural financial services 
development, investment climate in rural businesses, access to agricultural input and produce markets, business 
regulatory environment, trade policy, how  protectionism in the  country affects affect fairness of competition, how 
price control affect pricing of products of industries, non distortional nature of real corporate, how banking 
regulation hinders competitiveness, how labor regulations hinder business activities, impairment of economic 
development by subsidies, ease to start business.  
10
 Representative sources include: violent crime, organized crime, fairness of the judicial process, enforcement of 
contracts, speediness of judicial process, confiscation/expropriation, intellectual property rights protection, private 
property protection, cost of common crimes on business, cost of organized crime on business, pervasiveness of 
money laundering through banks, effectiveness of police, independence of the judiciary from political influence of 
government(citizens or firms), efficiency of legal framework to challenge the legality of government action, strength 
of intellectual property protection, strength of financial assets protection,  settlement of economic disputes, justice in 
commercial matters, intellectual property protection, effectiveness of arrangements for the protection of intellectual 
property, security rights and property transactions, trafficking of peoples, rate of illegal donations to parties, 
percentage of unofficial or unregistered firms, rate of tax evasion, confidence in the police force, confidence in the 
judicial system, rate of victimization of crime, independence of the judiciary, respect of law in relation between 
citizens and the administration, security of persons and goods, organized crime and activity, effectiveness of the 
fiscal system, effectiveness of the judicial system, security of property rights, security of contracts between private 
agents, government respect for contracts, judicial independence, level of impartiality of investors, and  threat of 
crime to business.  
 
 11
 What is important to note here is that these two law-measures encompass the four 
indicators considered by Beck et al. (2003) in theorizing the political and adaptability channels 
of law. Our indicators even go further than theirs as they are a summary of a plethora of 
measures mentioned on the footnotes pertaining to their definitions and elucidations above.
  
4.1.2 Growth and human development variables 
 
 While growth at overall economic and human levels are measured by GDP growth and 
GDP per capita growth respectively, human development is appreciated by the Inequality 
adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a 
composite statistic used by the World Bank to rank countries by levels of human development. It 
is a comparative measure of life-expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living 
worldwide. The 2010 Human Development Report was the first to adjust HDI with inequality 
factors (income, education and life expectancy). Therefore this work has the added appeal of 
using a recently unexplored indicator of human development.  
 
4.1.3 Instrumental variables 
 
 We assess legal origin dummies for the English, French and Portuguese colonial legacies. 
In order to ameliorate our contribution to the literature we add dummies for sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), and North Africa. These dummies are used as instruments. But for the SSAfrican dummy 
which reflects about 85 %( dataset without IHDI) and 80 %( dataset with IHDI) of the French 
                                                                               
11
 Non-representative sources include: Property rights and rule based on governance, family fear of crime, trust in 
courts of law, trust in police, trust in property rights and rule based governance,  accountability of the judiciary, trust 
in the police, trust in the Supreme Court, degree of common practice of tax evasion, degree of social justice, family 
mistrust in police, rate of family victimization by crime, personal security and protection of private property, and 
enforcement of patent and copyright protection.  
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legal origin dummy, all other dummies reflect quite distinct information or variability (see 
Appendix 2).   
 
4.1.4 Control variables 
 
 Our control variables are in line with the literature (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 
2011). We shall therefore control for inflation, trade, population growth, as well as government’s 
general final consumption expenditure in the law-development regressions. These control 
variables are all in ratios of GDP and obtained from ADI of the WB. 
 
4.1.5 Brief comparative analyses from Tables 1 & 2 
 
 Comparative summary statistics for countries with English, French, sub-Saharan-French, 
Portuguese and North African decent are discussed in Tables 1 and 2. A close scrutiny suggests 
that contrary to popular consensus, North African countries which have predominantly French 
civil-law origin dominate in GDP growth, GDP per capita, human development, regulation 
quality and the rule of law. As expected countries with English common-law overwhelming lead 
in trade while countries with French civil-law origin have the lowest levels of inflation.  
Preliminary assessment of differences in levels of trade and inflation is consistent with the law-
finance (growth) theory. English countries manifest higher levels of trade because they 
traditionally have legal systems that provide for competition and openness (in trade and capital). 
This is in accordance with Agbor (2011). On the other hand, countries with French legal 
tendencies averagely have the lowest levels of inflation because the French colonial legacy is 
focused on lowering levels of inflation since former French colonies have sacrificed financial 
independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972).  
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       Table 1: Comparative Statistics (Data without IHDI) 
  Growth Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables 
  
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
  
             
 
 
Mean 
English       4.654 2.49 0.378 0.407 10.79 87.88 2.096 16.09 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 4.146 1.55 0.305 0.278 3.748 65.31 2.577 12.62 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 6.404 3.916 0.267 0.259 112.57 94.20 2.172 13.18 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 4.076 1.236 0.280 0.243 3.873 63.40 2.832 11.96 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 4.616 3.135 0.422 0.472 3.959 68.45 20.29 14.70 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 4.597 2.202 0.332 0.330 18.84 77.64 1.450 14.14 0.421 0.473 0.105 0.394 0.105 
 
              
 
 
S.D 
English       3.70 3.50 0.185 0.216 14.87 46.61 0.869 5.72 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 4.21 3.96 0.148 0.175 8.744 28.85 1.16 4.73 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 7.12 6.87 0.164 0.250 574.06 34.92 0.382 4.44 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 4.48 4.12 0.135 0.156 9.55 30.20 1.102 4.848 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 2.303 2.304 0.135 0.141 3.581 20.29 0.334 2.782 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 4.45 4.24 0.171 0.211 193.5 39.88 1.02 5.41 0.494 0.499 0.307 0.489 0.307 
 
 
             
 
 
Min. 
English       -16.7 -17.1 0.044 0.029 -100 17.85 -1.07 5.41 --- --- --- --- --- 
French -12.6 -15.1 0.054 0.019 -100 21.57 0.591 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese -28.1 -29.6 0.044 0.014 -3.50 36.80 1.414 6.331 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa -12.6 -15.1 0.054 0.019 -100 21.57 0.707 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri -2.22 -3.59 0.156 0.105 18.67 38.36 0.591 6.77 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data -28.1 -29.6 0.044 0.014 -100 17.85 -1.07 2.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
             
 
 
Max. 
English       27.46 22.61 0.792 0.810 132.82 255.0 4.23 35.13 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 33.62 29.06 0.698 0.610 31.11 156.8 10.56 28.76 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 20.61 17.11 0.556 0.767 4145 179.0 3.03 21.28 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 33.62 29.06 0.698 0.519 31.11 156.8 10.56 28.76 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 12.21 10.59 0.688 0.610 0.339 124.6 1.923 19.35 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 33.62 29.06 0.792 0.810 4145 255.0 10.56 35.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
             
 
 
Obs. 
English       208 208 160 159 193 208 208 193 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 234 234 180 180 220 225 234 222 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 52 52 40 40 52 39 39 39 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 195 195 150 150 181 186 195 183 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 52 52 40 40 52 52 52 52 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 494 494 380 379 465 472 481 454 494 494 494 494 494 
S.D : Standard Deviation. Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum. Obs: Observations. Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl: Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government 
Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan 
Africa. Nafri: North Africa. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index.  
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Table 2: Comparative Statistics (Data with IHDI) 
  
Growth and Development Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables 
  
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
IHDI 
Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
   
             
 
 
Mean 
English       4.620 2.558 0.504 0.390 0.393 12.387 89.00 2.012 15.772 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 4.300 1.692 0.430 0.298 0.275 3.877 63.51 2.596 12.76 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 4.258 1.375 0.385 0.270 0.237 4.041 61.05 2.873 12.08 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 4.616 3.135 0.636 0.422 0.472 3.959 68.45 1.450 14.70 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 4.426 2.032 0.459 0.334 0.321 7.325 73.784 2.367 13.917 0.392 0.607 --- 0.500 0.142 
 
               
 
 
S.D 
English       2.487 2.550 0.102 0.186 0.227 16.74 43.46 0.685 5.856 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 4.198 3.948 0.125 0.148 0.178 8.983 28.75 1.189 4.822 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 4.482 4.127 0.082 0.132 0.159 9.876 30.01 1.126 4.980 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 2.303 2.304 0.053 0.135 0.141 3.581 20.29 0.334 2.782 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 3.62 3.48 0.122 0.170 0.207 13.35 37.51 1.059 5.436 0.489 0.489 --- 0.500 0.350 
 
               
 
 
Min. 
English       
-4.975 -7.797 0.376 0.044 0.029 -100.00 17.85 0.548 5.416 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 
-12.67 -15.15 0.204 0.054 0.019 -100.00 21.57 0.591 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 
-12.67 -15.15 0.204 0.054 0.019 -100.00 21.57 0.707 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 
-2.227 -3.591 0.521 0.156 0.105 0.339 38.36 0.591 6.774 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 
-12.67 -15.15 0.204 0.044 0.019 -100.00 17.85 0.548 2.650 0.000 0.000 --- 0.000 0.000 
 
               
 
 
Max. 
English       11.28 8.906 0.743 0.792 0.810 132.82 209.41 3.165 35.13 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 33.62 29.062 0.721 0.698 0.610 31.11 156.86 10.56 28.76 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 33.62 29.06 0.544 0.698 0.519 31.11 156.86 10.56 28.76 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 12.21 10.59 0.721 0.688 0.610 18.67 124.63 1.923 19.351 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 33.62 29.06 0.743 0.792 0.810 132.82 209.41 10.564 35.13 1.000 1.000 --- 1.000 1.000 
 
               
 
 
Obs. 
English       143 143 143 110 110 141 143 143 130 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 221 221 221 170 170 207 212 221 209 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 182 182 182 140 140 168 173 182 170 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafri 52 52 52 40 40 52 52 52 52 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 364 364 364 280 280 348 355 364 339 364 364 --- 364 364 
S.D : Standard Deviation. Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum. Obs: Observations. Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl: Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. 
GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa. 
IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. 
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4.2 Methodology  
 
4.2.1 Estimation method 
 
 In accordance with Beck et al. (2003) and recent empirical literature (Agbor, 2011; 
Asongu, 2011) we employ a Two-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS) methodology with dummies of 
legal origins as instrumental variables. This estimation technique has the particular advantage 
of looking at the issue of endogeneity. Thus the instrumental variable estimator can avoid the 
bias that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates suffer-from when explanatory variables in a 
regression are correlated with the disturbance term. More so the context out paper (use of legal 
origin as instruments) requires an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation method. In the 
approach we shall adopt the following steps: 
-provide justification for the use of a TSLS approach over an OLS estimation technique 
through the Hausman-test for endogeneity; 
-show that instrumental variables (legal origins) explain the endogenous components of 
explaining variables (law channels), conditional on other covariates; 
-check the validity of the instruments via an Over-identifying restriction (OIR) test.  
 Our methodology includes the following models: 
 
First-stage regression:  
 
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrench)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                                (1) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX  
 
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrenchssa)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                           (2) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX  
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Second-stage regression: 
 
 
++= itit egulationQualityofrtDevelopmen )(10 γγ +itRuleoflaw)(2γ +itiXβ µ
                     (3)                                           
  
  
 
In all three equations, X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in some of the 
second stage regressions. For the first/second and third equations,  v  and u, respectively 
represent  the error terms. Instrumental variables are the five legal origin dummies. 
‘Development’ encompasses GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and human development. 
Frenchssa is the dummy for French SSA.  
 
4.2.2 Choice of endogenous regressors for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
 
 The quality of control covariates at the second stage of the TSLS method is very crucial. 
These covariates for control must be justified by an underlying theory in which instruments are 
exogenous to them. In this study we adopt Trade and Inflation as endogenous variables of 
control because they are backed by the underlying law-growth theory and can be explained by 
the instruments. For instance the law-growth theory historically and empirically demonstrates 
that trade in English common-law countries will be greater than in French civil-law countries 
because traditionally, the former countries are more opened(in trade and capital) and 
competitive(Agbor,2011). On the other hand countries with French legal tendencies should 
have the lowest levels of inflation because french colonial legacy has focused on sacrificing 
financial independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972). A 
close comparative scrutiny of tables 1 and 2 justify the choice of these variables (Trade and 
Inflation)12.  
                         
12
 Inflation is lowest for French countries and Trade significantly higher in English countries with respect to their 
French counterparts.  
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5. Cross-country regressions 
 
 This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to assess the importance 
of legal origin in explaining cross-country variance in economic growth and human 
development, the ability of legal origin to explain cross-country differences in regulation 
quality and rule of law indicators, and the ability of the exogenous components of the law 
channels to account for cross-country differences in economic growth and human development.  
 
5.1 Legal origins and development 
 
 In Table 3, we regress our growth and human development indicators on the legal origin 
dummies and also test for their joint significance. The Scandinavian legal origin is measured by 
the constant. Results in Panel A show that distinguishing countries by legal origin helps explain 
cross-country differences in growth and human development. Even after controlling for trade, 
inflation and government expenditure, the legal origin dummies enter jointly significantly in all 
regressions at 1% significance level. Growth in GDP and GDP per capita is highest in countries 
with Portuguese civil-law origin, followed by English common-law countries, then North-
African countries and lastly French-speaking countries of SSA.  On effects on human 
development, the same order is respected but with Portuguese countries absent (as the 
regressions are based on the second data set).   
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Table 3:  Development and legal origin regressions  
Panel A: Regressions unconditional on other covariates  
  Economic Growth  Human 
Development(IHDI) 
  GDP Growth(GDPg) Welfare(GDPpcg) 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* 
 
 
 
Legal Origin 
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  4.629*** 4.434*** 2.399*** 2.338*** 0.484*** 0.457*** 
 (14.97) (14.24) (8.229) (8.004) (64.96 ) (45.82) 
French  4.079*** --- 1.298*** --- 0.390*** --- 
 (13.20)  (4.452)  (61.40)  
Frenchssa --- 4.076*** --- 1.236*** --- 0.385*** 
  (12.78)  (4.130)  (44.03) 
Portuguese  6.404*** 6.404*** 3.916*** 3.916*** --- --- 
 (10.45) (10.37) (6.775) (6.756)   
Northafrica 0.399 3.507*** 1.561** 2.550*** 0.222*** 0.522*** 
 (0.603) (5.632) (2.504) (4.366) (16.72) (31.55) 
 
F-stats(for instruments) 3.846*** 132.34*** 7.227*** 39.006*** 170.95*** 1850.86*** 
Adjusted  R² 0.017 0.516 0.036 0.236 0.483 0.938 
Observations 494 494 494 494 364 364 
       
Panel B: Regressions conditional on other covariates 
  Economic Growth Human 
Development(IHDI) 
  GDP Growth(GDPg) Welfare(GDPpcg) 
  Model  4 Model  4* Model  5 Model  5* Model 6 Model 6* 
 
 
 
Legal Origin 
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  5.994*** 4.092*** 2.180*** 1.919*** 0.405*** 0.276*** 
 (7.683) (6.206) (4.472) (4.214) (25.14) (17.08) 
French  5.078*** --- 1.133*** --- 0.335*** --- 
 (8.628)  (2.768)  (26.68)  
Frenchssa --- 3.871*** --- 0.919** --- 0.251*** 
  (7.550)  (2.339)  (19.26) 
Portuguese 8.368*** 6.992*** 5.509*** 5.280*** --- --- 
 (8.947) (7.835) (7.329) (7.161)   
Northafrica 0.503 3.417*** 1.569*** 2.318*** 0.226*** 0.415*** 
 (0.897) (5.359) (2.735) (4.042) (19.31) (25.52) 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Inflation -0.006 0.008 --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.400) (0.552)     
Trade -0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-1.538) (-0.432) (0.537) (1.136) (11.02) (12.70) 
Gov. Exp. -0.043 0.019 --- --- -0.002*** 0.001** 
 (-1.154) (0.560)   (-2.784) (2.092) 
 
F-stats(for instruments) 3.659*** 85.285*** 12.028*** 43.821*** 140.73*** 1709.36*** 
Adjusted  R² 0.037 0.588 0.085 0.313 0.623 0.962 
Observations 414 414 472 472 338 338 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  IHDI: Inequality adjusted 
Human Development Index. Frenchssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 19
 5.2 Legal origins and law channels 
 
Table 4 below assesses whether legal origin explains cross-country differences in the 
law indicators which are characterized by the regulation quality and rule of law channels.  
Table 4: Law channels and legal origin regressions  
                        Panel A: Regressions unconditional on other covariates  
  
      Quality of Regulation            Rule of Law 
  Model 7 Model 7* Model 8 Model 8* 
 
 
 
 
Legal Origin 
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  0.371*** 0.357*** 0.395*** 0.383*** 
 (28.48) (26.09) (25.46) (24.14) 
French  0.286*** --- 0.247*** --- 
 (21.92)  (15.97)  
Frenchssa --- 0.280*** --- 0.243*** 
  (19.92)  (15.02) 
Portuguese 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 
 (10.35) (9.831) (8.441) (8.242) 
Northafrica 0.115*** 0.333*** 0.188*** 0.376*** 
 (4.131) (12.14) (5.684) (11.89) 
 
F-stats(for instruments) 13.71*** 353.82*** 25.16*** 275.58*** 
Adjusted  R² 0.091 0.788 0.160 0.744 
Observations 380 380 379 379 
     
                  Panel B:Regressions conditional on other covariates 
 
 
 
 
Legal Origin 
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
 
      Quality of Regulation           Rule of Law 
 Model  9 Model 9* Model 10 Model 10* 
English 0.469*** 0.237*** 0.550*** 0.184*** 
 (18.36) (8.056) (18.68) (5.878) 
French  0.371*** --- 0.376*** --- 
 (12.57)  (11.09)  
Frenchssa --- 0.177*** --- 0.073*** 
  (7.274)  (2.805) 
Portuguese 0.402*** 0.281*** 0.454*** 0.260*** 
 (11.14) (6.440) (10.95) (5.614) 
Northafrica 0.077*** 0.241*** 0.132*** 0.231*** 
 (2.654) (7.676) (3.946) (6.909) 
 
 
 
 
Control Variables 
Inflation -0.001* --- -0.003*** --- 
 (-1.724)  (-3.713)  
Trade --- 0.0003 --- 0.001*** 
  (1.361)  (4.367) 
Pop. growth -0.030** --- -0.044*** --- 
 (-3.110)  (-3.915)  
Gov. Exp. --- 0.006*** --- 0.008*** 
  (3.981)  (4.396) 
 
F-stats(for instruments) 12.080*** 255.35*** 25.46*** 252.21*** 
Adjusted  R² 0.137 0.820 0.261 0.819 
Observations 348 335 347 334 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  IHDI: Inequality 
adjusted Human Development Index. Frenchssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets. 
 
 20
We regress the proxies for law indicators on the legal origin dummy variables. We 
report F-test of whether legal origin dummy variables taken together explain significantly 
cross-country variations in the rule of law and regulation quality. Clearly legal origin helps 
explain cross-country differences in the law indicators as the F-test of the joint significance of 
these dummies indicate that legal origin is significant at 1% level. Even after controlling for 
population growth, trade, inflation and final government expenditure, results are still appealing 
(Panel B). On average British common-law countries dominate in both indicators while French 
civil-law countries from SSA are least. These findings are consistent with the law-growth 
theory elucidated above. 
 
5.3 Examination of law channels using a TSLS Instrumental Variable procedure  
 
 Table 5 addresses the issues of: (1) whether the exogenous components of the rule of 
law and regulation quality indicators explain growth and development and (2) whether legal 
origin explains growth and development through some other mechanisms other than law 
channels. To make this assessment we use TSLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. So at this stage we add equation (3) to the estimations. When combining either 
equations (1) and (3) or equations (2) and (3), two pairs of four legal origin dummies are used 
as instrumental variables (we do not use French and SSA-French at the same time). Even when 
all five instruments are used in a single regression, the second-stage results do not change 
significantly. What we seek to address by this robustness check is the evident correlation 
between French countries and French-SSAfrican countries13.   
                         
13
 To further investigate if evidence of correlation between the SSAfrican and French dummies have some bearing 
on the outcome of our regressions, for each model we carried-out three different regressions: the first and second 
in which we independently verify the validity of   the French and SSAfrican dummies as instruments and the third 
in which we use both of them simultaneously. We do not find any substantial difference in results. Our use of the 
five dummies provides us with the degrees of freedom sufficient for the OIR-test for instrument validity.  
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 At first glance, our results justify the use of the TSLS estimation method as the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman-test is rejected in all regressions. This implies OLS estimates are 
not consistent due of the presence of endogeneity. Secondly we check the validity of our 
instruments through the OIR-test and find that all instruments are valid. Therefore, the 
instruments do suffer from the same problem (correlation with the disturbance term) as the 
endogenous regressors in the equation of interest (equation 3). 
 The first issue of whether the exogenous components of the rule of law and regulation 
quality explain economic growth and human development can be appreciated from the 
significance of their corresponding estimated coefficients. On the second concern of knowing if 
legal origin explains growth and development through some other mechanisms than law 
channels, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR-test in all regressions suggests that 
legal origins explain economic growth and human development  through law channels(when 
other determinants of growth and development are controlled for). It is also worth noting that 
regulatory quality has a higher impact on the endogenous variables than the rule of law.  
Table 5:  Development and Law second stage regressions  
  Growth(GDPg) Welfare(GDPpcg) Development(IHDI) 
  Model  11 Model  11* Model  12 Model  12* Model 13 Model 13* 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Qua. 8.910** --- 12.93*** --- 1.640** --- 
 (2.062)  (2.971)  (2.339)  
Rule of  Law --- 3.030 --- 8.046*** --- 0.938*** 
  (0.792)  (2.576)  (3.080) 
 
Control 
Variables 
Inflation 0.027** 0.023* 0.030*** 0.026*** -0.009 -0.015 
 (2.320) (1.791) (3.104) (2.872) (-0.698) (-1.037) 
Trade 0.014 0.040** -0.031 -0.009 -5.004 0.003** 
 (0.618) (2.017) (-1.323) (-0.615) (-0.014) (2.171) 
Hausman test 93.71*** 115.79*** 44.60*** 50.73*** 744.41*** 919.95*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 0.793 1.595 0.526 0.433 0.708 0.340 
P-values [0.672] [0.450] [0.768] [0.805] [0.400] [0.559] 
Adjusted R² 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.002 0.243 0.271 
Fisher-stats 85.02*** 39.51*** 38.20*** 36.60*** 36.07*** 43.21*** 
Observations 339 338 339 338 259 259 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  IHDI: Inequality 
adjusted Human Development Index. OIR: Over identifying restrictions test. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM 
statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
 While past works have assessed how legal origin explains financial development, this 
paper examines the mechanisms by which traditional legal legacies handed down to colonies by 
former colonial powers affect economic growth. We also use a novel indicator first introduced 
in 2010 to measure the impact of legal channels on inequality adjusted human development. 
Our results show that the quality of regulation and rule of law are exogenous to economic 
growth and human development, with the effect of the former (quality of regulation) higher 
than that of the later. Findings also reveal that legal origin does not explain economic growth 
and human development through some other mechanisms than law channels when other 
potential exogenous determinants of economic growth and human development (consistent 
with the law-growth theory and empirically valid) are controlled for. 
 Our results support the current consensus (LLSV., 1998; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 
2011) that English common-law countries provide for legal systems that improve conditions for 
economic growth and human development than French civil-law countries. Portuguese civil-
law countries lie between the French-speaking and North African countries, while French sub-
Saharan Africa is slightly below the average of Francophone Africa.  As a policy implication 
results support benefits of the rule of law and quality of regulation as channels to economic 
growth and human development.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Presentation of legal origin and countries (without IHDI) 
Panel A: Countries in dataset without IHDI 
Legal origins Countries Num. 
 
English 
 Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Seirra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia.  
 
 
16 
 
French 
 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
 
18 
Portuguese  Angola, Cape Verde,  Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. 
 
4 
French  sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
 
 
15 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,  4 
   
Panel B: Countries in dataset with IHDI 
 
English 
 Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia.  
 
 
11 
 
French 
 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, 
Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
 
17 
French  sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
 
 
15 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,  4 
IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. Num: Number of countries.  
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                        Appendix 2:  Correlation analyses 
Panel A: Correlation Analysis for the first dataset without the Inequality adjusted Human Development  Index(IHDI)  
Growth and Development Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables  
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
IHDI 
Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
 
1.000 0.971 --- 0.020 0.0002 0.078 -0.010 0.220 -0.022 0.010 -0.096 0.139 -0.094 0.001 GDPg 
 1.000 --- 0.086 0.082 0.072 0.082 -0.017 0.061 0.059 -0.143 0.138 -0.183 0.075 GDPpcg 
  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- IHDI 
   1.000 0.799 -0.091 0.046 -0.277 0.193 0.231 -0.149 -0.129 -0.245 0.181 Reg. Qua. 
    1.000 -0.090 0.239 -0.347 0.341 0.308 -0.233 -0.116 -0.331 0.230 Rule of Law 
     1.000 0.103 0.039 -0.149 -0.035 -0.074 0.172 -0.061 -0.027 Inflation 
      1.000 -0.403 0.377 0.228 -0.295 0.124 -0.288 -0.081 Trade 
       1.000 -0.332 -0.204 0.229 -0.047 0.400 -0.301 Popg 
        1.000 0.309 -0.276 -0.054 -0.331 0.037 Gov. Exp. 
         1.000 -0.809 -0.292 -0.688 -0.118 English 
          1.000 -0.325 0.851 0.189 French 
           1.000 -0.277 -0.117 Portuguese 
            1.000 -0.277 Frenchssa 
             1.000 Northafrica 
               
               
Panel B: Correlation Analysis for the second dataset with the Inequality adjusted Human Development  Index(IHDI)  
Growth and Development Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables  
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
IHDI 
Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
 
1.000 0.953 0.003 0.086 0.065 0.028 -0.034 0.209 -0.074 0.043 -0.043 --- -0.046 0.021 GDPg 
 1.000 0.176 0.162 0.163 0.016 0.090 -0.082 0.021 0.121 -0.121 --- -0.188 0.129 GDPpcg 
  1.000 0.495 0.509 -0.066 0.425 -0.582 0.149 0.297 -0.297 --- -0.608 0.590 IHDI 
   1.000 0.853 -0.018 0.180 -0.275 0.203 0.264 -0.264 --- -0.379 0.211 Reg. Qua. 
    1.000 -0.038 0.261 -0.351 0.253 0.278 -0.278 --- -0.408 0.298 Rule of Law 
     1.000 -0.124 0.029 -0.112 0.313 -0.313 --- -0.237 -0.105 Inflation 
      1.000 -0.416 0.333 0.333 0.333 --- -0.331 -0.059 Trade 
       1.000 -0.315 -0.269 0.269 --- 0.478 -0.353 Popg 
        1.000 0.269 -0.269 --- -0.337 0.061 Gov. Exp. 
         1.000 -1.000 --- -0.804 -0.119 English 
          1.000 --- 0.804 0.119 French 
           --- --- --- Portuguese 
            1.000 -0.408 Frenchssa 
             1.000 Northafrica 
               
Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl: Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. IHDI: Inequality 
adjusted Human Development Index Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa. 
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